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This article studies the causal factors behind the major overhaul of Russia’s 
system for children in substitute care that has been taking place since the 
late 2000’s. A series of reforms have promoted fostering and family-like care 
in contrast to the large residential homes used in the Soviet period and 1990’s. 
We highlight the fundamental change in the 'ideal of care' represented by 
the move to 'deinstitutionalise' the care system by promoting domestic adop-
tions, increasing the number of foster families, creating early support services 
for families as well as restructuring remaining residential institutions into 
smaller, home-like environments. These are all key elements of the global 
deinstitutionalisation trend that is taking place around the globe. We look at 
the evolution of the related policies and ask why this policy shift happened 
during the 2010’s even though the issue of reform had partially been on the 
Russian policy agenda for some time. Building on an explanatory approach 
to family policy changes by Magritta Mäztke and Ilona Ostner, which in-
corporates material and ideational driving forces, we explain that the 'political 
will from above' behind these major reforms was shaped by a range of other 
societal and political factors. Multiple factors drove Russian political actors 
to adopt new ideas about care for children left without parental care. For 
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instance, the increasing conservative turn in policies towards children and 
families, which are driven by the severe demographic decline in the country, 
work alongside the influence of international norms around children’s rights 
and changing socio-economic circumstances. In the 1990’s Russian NGOs 
had considerable input into the reforms as 'epistemic communities' in policy 
formation thanks to the high level of expertise that they developed in inter-
national networks and the increasing number of cross-sector consultative 
platforms at governmental bodies in contemporary Russia. We conclude that 
ideational factors were necessary preconditions for the reforms, but that 
political forces were ultimately the key driving force. The recentralisation 
of power and prioritisation of social policy under President Putin allowed 
new ideas to gain concrete policy realisation.
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Introduction
Following a long period of policy inaction, activist campaigning and in-
ternational criticism, the Russian government is now radically reforming the 
state system for children in substitute care, both family-based and institutio-
nal. The recent initiatives strive to 'deinstitutialise' Russia’s care system by 
promoting adoptions, increasing the number of foster families, creating family 
support services to prevent children from entering the care system as well as 
restructuring remaining residential institutions into smaller, home-like envi-
ronments. These moves are all key elements that will bring Russia into line 
with the deinstitutionalisation trend that has taken place around the globe (e. g. 
Ainsworth, Thoburn 2014; Holm-Hansen et al. 2005).
In this article, we seek to understand the evolution of policies in this 
sphere and to explain why these major reforms finally happened in the 2010’s. 
The scale and speed of the child welfare reform make it an excellent case for 
analysing the drivers of such fundamental policy change in Russia, especially 
given the country’s longstanding history and internationally high rates of in-
stitutional care. The reform took many experts by surprise given the overall 
view that 'macro-scale changes to the Russian orphanage system … appear 
unlikely to happen soon' (Disney 2015: 22).
The reforms are based on the idea of every child’s right to grow up in a fam-
ily. Russia inherited a network of large residential institutions for children from 
the USSR in which 'care' was collective and generally defined as meeting mate-
rial and educational needs in a rather strict, regimented fashion rather than focus-
ing on relationships, societal inclusion and life skills (cf. UNICEF 2010; Phillips 
2009). Residential care was long-term and often in large, geographically isolated 
institutions with little return to biological families or contact with local services 
and communities. The outcomes for young people who had been in state care 
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were generally very poor, leading to high stigma of the children living in state 
care homes (Khlinovskaya 2010). A number of local and regional projects – often 
with NGO and international support – aimed to improve the situation in the 
1990’s, but policy action at a national level was limited until the 2010’s.
This situation is now drastically different with a shift to the placement of 
children without parental care in foster families instead of residential institu-
tions: the number of children placed in families is now tenfold in comparison 
to the early 2000’s (Biryukova, Sinyavskaya, this issue p. 371–372). The Rus-
sian Government has set a goal that 90 % of children in substitute care will live 
in families (Russian Government 2013), preferably in biological ones when 
possible, but, if not, then in adoptive or fostering ones. This wholesale change 
in the care system has been underpinned by a series of government strategies 
and decrees addressing both fostering and the restructuring of large children’s 
homes into 'family support centres' with small-group homes, where children 
can temporarily live whilst awaiting family placement. The changes shift the 
ideal of state care from collective, institutionalised and often impersonal care 
to personalised care with biological, adoptive or foster parents or in family-
like institutions. New ideas and organisational principles have been introduced 
to a system that shapes the lives of over 600,000 children who do not live with 
their birth parents. In sum, the reform can be regarded as a 'paradigm change' 
in the underpinning ideals and institutional design of the child welfare system: 
a 'fundamental revision of the broad ways of thinking about the aims and 
means of policy' in a particular field (Khmelnitskaya 2015: 16).
Our article first presents an explanatory framework for understanding 
these policy changes that incorporates both the role of ideas and institutional/
material factors. Separate empirical sections then consider the political and so-
cietal drivers of the evolution of ideas on child welfare in Russia and institu-
tional factors that facilitated the top-down reforms. This explanatory approach 
helps to understand why the child welfare laws were only adopted in the 2010’s 
even though the issue of deinstitutionalisation had been on the policy agenda for 
a longer period of time (cf. Holm-Hansen et al. 2005). We ultimately conclude 
that the timing of the reforms was driven mostly by the policy and societal focus 
on the well-being of vulnerable children in combination with the centralisation 
of political power from the late 2000’s onwards that ensured reforms could be 
implemented 'from above'.
To study the development of these major reforms, this paper draws on in-
terviews with activists and NGOs conducted in 2015–2017 as well as the analy-
sis of key policy and legislative documents, government briefings and published 
articles with key actors. This approach tallies with scholarship on the role of 
ideas in social policy, which suggests that 'a careful and selective use of textual 
documents, public opinion surveys and interviews with experts and policy-
makers helps to provide evidence about the causal role of frames and policy 
ideas in legislative and policy processes' (Beland 2005: 15).
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Conceptual Framework: Why do Family Policies Change?
Our analysis of the reforms is guided by a conceptual framework devel-
oped by Margitta Mätzke and Ilona Ostner (Mätzke, Ostner 2010a) to explain 
change in European family policy. It combines the two main types of explana-
tion for welfare reforms: ideas (from the constructivist paradigm of policy 
studies) and material-institutional factors (from institutionalist approaches). 
Both societal dynamics and narrower political factors can be identified within 
each type of explanation for why new policies are adopted.
Mätzke and Ostner (Mätzke, Ostner 2010 b: 474) highlight  that policy 
ideas are 'the crucial driving forces that turn political opportunities into policy 
innovation.' New ideas have causal power in terms of determining the content 
of reforms, for example the changes in goals and delivery of welfare services. 
There are both societal and political explanations for the evolution of new 
policy ideas. Public opinion – albeit influenced by media and political dis-
courses – can be important in seeking or alternatively blocking change, for 
example in the case of the public protests in Russia in 2005 over the monetisa-
tion of benefits (Wengle, Rasell 2008). Within the political field, considerable 
attention is often paid to 'epistemic communities' as the generators of ideas. 
These are specialists from think tanks, politics, academia and NGOs who have 
expert knowledge in a particular field and who contribute to the development 
of policy solutions 'in the early policy design stages of the policy cycle where 
the uncertainty of novel policy problems is at  its peak' (Dunlop 2013: 230). 
Such expert knowledge frequently has a transnational aspect in terms of ideas 
that are circulating globally or the direct involvement of foreign experts in 
policy development (Dunlop 2013: 230).
Research in the early 2000s found limited opportunities for advocacy 
coalitions/epistemic communities to promote family-like alternatives in Rus-
sia due to institutional inertia, limited household finances and unfamiliarity 
with adopting and fostering in Russian society (Holm-Hansen et al. 2005: 77). 
The fit between expert / NGO messages and political discourses is also an im-
portant consideration: Bogdanova and Bindman (2016: 169) write that 'the cur-
rent discourse of the state social policy has to be taken into account' when ana-
lysing Russian NGO involvement in social policy at the regional level because 
whilst the 'protection of children is legitimated by the current political mood 
… not every project for child protection can be promoted.' The ideas of epis-
temic communities thus need to fit with the thinking and rhetoric from deci-
sion-makers on a particular issue in order to contribute to ideational change in 
policy circles.
Yet, ideational explanations are not sufficient to fully explain policy 
shifts. Material and institutional forces are important in shaping the prioritisa-
tion of new ideas and their translation into concrete legislation and policies. For 
example, the potential impact of epistemic communities and non-governmental 
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actors will inevitably be shaped by the openness of a political system and the 
existence of channels for societal-government dialogue. The recent develop-
ment of p´artnership´ or n´etwork´ styles of governance in Russia thus provides 
a platform for epistemic communities to present their ideas and proposals 
(Berg-Nordlie et al. 2017). The nature of a political system and balance of 
power between various political and societal actors are also important, as 
Duma and regional opposition to social welfare reforms in Russia in the 1990’s 
clearly demonstrated (Cook 2007). In some cases, organised groups and civil 
society actors can be important drivers or else obstacles to change, from NGOs 
to professional and public unions. More widely, contextual factors also affect 
the impetus and range of options for reform, for example population demo-
graphic factors, state budgetary resources and levels of expertise in govern-
ment circles, all of which have constrained social policy in Russia in the 1990’s 
and 2000’s.
In sum, both ideational and institutional factors are important in shaping 
policy change and indeed cannot be fully separated in practice, for example 
the knowledge of expert groups and institutional platforms through which they 
can relay ideas and messages. Table 1 summarises the framework (based on 
Mätzke Ostner 2010 a: 393) that we utilise to explain the change in Russian 
child welfare policy:
Table 1
 Conceptual framework to explain child welfare policy change in Russia
Dynamics and agents of change
Societal explanations Political explanations
Driving 
forces
Material and 
institutional 
factors
Demographic pressures; 
socio-economic factors;  
societal groups and 
organised interests
Political system;  
institutional actors; 
policymaking structures
Ideas Public opinion, mass attitudes
Epistemic communities, 
rhetoric action 
by political actors
In line with the framework, the next section considers ideational factors 
driving the child welfare reforms in Russia, highlighting the role of global norms, 
local NGOs, government focus on children’s well-being and public opinion. After 
this, we explore the material and institutional factors in the 2010s that meant these 
ideas could find realisation in new laws and decrees.
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Idealist explanations: global norms, public opinion 
and epistemic communities
Global norms and NGOs
Debates about the potential reform of Russia’s child welfare system were 
strongly shaped in the 1990’s onwards by the international push towards deinstitu-
tionalisation. A range of United Nations and Council of Europe initiatives exposed 
Russian policy structures to international ideas on children’s rights and family-
based care, on which Russia has needed to report at regular intervals. These inter-
national norms had influence in both societal and political arenas (cf. Holm-Hansen 
et al. 2005). During the relatively open Yeltsin period, Russian NGOs, activists and 
reform-minded practitioners co-operated with international charities, organisations 
and funding programmes, thus receiving the opportunity to apply the rights-based 
and child-focused approaches promoted around the world. International projects 
meant that some individual children’s homes started reform processes and several 
regions piloted their own models of family care and fostering. Yet, these projects 
were rather fragmented and there was no change to the overall model of institu-
tional care, which remained subject to on-going criticism by both local and interna-
tional NGOs (Levada Centre 2010; Human Rights Watch 2014). The international 
collaboration of NGOs has been increasingly restricted since the mid-2000s (John-
son et al. 2016; Skokova et al. forthcoming), but they have continued to utilise their 
professional experience and act as clear advocates and 'experts' in the field of dein-
stitutionalisation and children’s rights through media reports, interviews, adverts, 
events and continued participation in international networks and events. Crucially, 
though, they needed adequate policy structures to transmit their ideas and advice, 
which happened only later, as discussed below.
Increased government rhetoric 
about children left without parental care
Since the mid-2000’s, Russian governments have increasingly prioritised 
social and family issues, including pro-natalist measures to stimulate the birth 
rate, the creation of children’s rights commissioners at the federal and regional 
level, funding streams for NGO projects around children and families and 
a conservative, nationalistically tinged rhetoric about the importance of 'tradi-
tional' family values in Russia.
The increasing attention paid to the well-being of Russian children and fami-
lies has also encompassed children in state care. President Putin’s famous 2006 
speech on Russia’s 'demographic crisis' briefly mentioned the issue of children left 
without parental care (Rotkirch et al. 2007), but the issue was only directly ad-
dressed by President Medvedev in 2010, who stated that children in institutions are 
'denied the most important thing – family warmth' (Medvedev 2010). He directed 
custody officials to focus on 'placing those children in families and helping foster 
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families' and continued that 'there should be no "un-adopted" children in our coun-
try'. Medvedev’s speech also referred to social adaptation and support after leaving 
state care, saying that 'it is not enough to just teach and feed them; we have to help 
them start a new adult life, be ready for it, be self-confident'.
President Medvedev’s 2010 speech can be seen as the catalyst for policy 
action because it was followed by several national programmes in the field. 
Interes tingly, these documents were often designed with significant input from 
activists and NGOs, as we discuss later. One of them is 'National Children’s 
Strategy to Promote the Interests of Children in 2012–2017', established by 
presidential decree in June 2012. Its primary goal was to overhaul the system of 
institutional care by reorganising children’s homes into 'family support centres' 
whose primary task was to place children in biological or foster families through 
support and training services. The National Children’s Strategy was important 
in setting out key ideas about alternatives to residential institutions and contains 
frequent references to international documents and notions of children’s rights, 
suggesting that global norms were recognised in government circles.
The proposals of the National Children’s Strategy were formalised in law 
through a series of decrees and laws. This started with Presidential De-
cree No 1688, which was issued on 28 December 2012 and directed officials to 
begin work on improving fostering and adoption processes. It also added a spe-
cific criterion about the proportion of children living in family care to the annual 
evaluation of the 'effectiveness' of regional governors as a way of stimulating 
change across Russia. Alongside this government action, the presidential party, 
United Russia, established a nationwide programme 'Russia Needs All Its Chil-
dren' in January 2013, which tasked regional branches of the party to develop 
'road maps' for preventing children from entering care and promoting family 
placements. Foster care was also one of the main issues in the 'State Concept for 
Family Policy in the Russian Federation until 2025', which was adopted in August 
2014, pointing to the central priority of the issue for the government.
Finally, Decree RF No 481 from May 2014 introduced mandatory reforms 
of residential institutions. It is a watershed document that has been described as 
'revolutionary' because 'children’s lives in orphanages is starting to look like 
ordinary children’s lives instead of life in jail,' as put by Elena Al’shanskaya, one 
of the most prominent NGO campaigners for the reform. The decree fundamen-
tally altered the goals and nature of care in institutions. It instantiated the Na-
tional Children’s Strategy by restructuring children’s homes into 'family support 
centres' with the primary task of working with biological and foster families. A 
'family like' environment for children in state care is explicitly promoted by 
transforming institutions into small-group homes where children will use local 
facilities such as schools, kindergartens and local polyclinics to promote their 
social integration. It is expected that children will live in these new small-group 
homes on a temporary basis because family placement is the ultimate goal. The 
decree also abandoned many features of the previous system, including the 
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separation of siblings and division of children on the basis of age or health. De-
cree RF No 481 therefore clearly instantiated the strong family discourse emerg-
ing from the federal government and made it binding on all regions.
In sum, the attention paid to reforming provision for children in state care arose 
from the increasing 'family talk' on the governmental agenda. It also resonated with 
increasing focus on this topic in the wider society, as is explored below.
Changes in public opinion
At the same time as increasing their attention on family welfare, Russian 
policymakers and other conservative social actors, including the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, created 'moral panics' surrounding childhood, which started to take 
root among the wider public. Various threats to Russian children have been 
mooted from foreign adoptive parents to unregulated internet spaces and 'homo-
sexual propaganda'. In particular, the death of a Russian child who had been 
adopted by American parents was widely reported in the Russian media and 
prompted a ban on the adoption of Russian children by US citizens in December 
2012, thus cancelling a key exit route from institutional care for children. The so-
called Dima Yakovlev law received a mixed reaction, enjoying substantial support 
among the general public but also generating public protests (Radio Free Europe 
2013). Importantly, it drew public attention to Russia’s own care system and the 
very poor outcomes for young people leaving residential care. A number of abuse 
scandals in children’s homes furthered media and public interest in the topic.
Concern over 'threats' to Russian children – including those in residential 
care – was therefore strong in policy circles and the wider society. Public cam-
paigns by government agencies and NGOs have encouraged Russians to enlist 
as foster parents and recognise the growing professionalisation of both social 
workers and foster families in the child welfare system. These various dynamics 
have softened longstanding societal scepticism about fostering and the needs of 
children in care: in 2016, 81 % of Russians regarded foster placements as the best 
place for children in state care (Fond Izmeni Odnu Zhizn 2016). There were thus 
clear societal expectations that the residential care system needed major reform 
even if they are hard to disentangle from the family orientation emanating from 
the government and the knowledge of deinstitutionalisation developed in NGOs 
and epistemic communities (cf. Lough 2003). Yet, the various ideational pushes 
for deinstitutionalisation could only have force due to the facilitation of several 
institutional and material factors, as considered in the next section.
Material Factors: Resources and Policy Structures
Demographic and socioeconomic factors
Society-level explanations of amendments to family policy often evoke the 
pressure of socio-economic and demographic change (cf. Mätzke, Ostner 
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2010 a: 393). Indeed, the child welfare reforms developed against a backdrop of 
increasing political, media and societal anxiety about the country’s 'demographic 
crisis.' After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was the scene of one of the 
most severe population declines seen among peacetime industrialised countries, 
This led to a statist turn in social policies and associated focus on family issues 
and population health (e. g. Kulmala et al. 2014.) This has driven policies to in-
crease the birth rate, for example through 'maternity capital' payments (Rotkirch 
et al. 2007), as well as a focus on the health and well-being of vulnerable chil-
dren, including those left without parental care.
At the same time, the stabilisation and growth of the Russian economy in the 
2000’s (Kainu et al. 2017) meant that both policymakers and ordinary Russians 
no longer had to focus on everyday survival and could therefore pay attention to 
the fostering and the well-being of children in institutional care. Related improve-
ments to state finances, including the possibility of regular, on-time payments of 
social benefits to foster parents, meant that major reforms of the child welfare 
sector could be contemplated even though saving costs is undoubtedly part of the 
Russian government’s motivation for deinstitutionalisation: placing a child in 
family care is typically cheaper than residential care (Jones 1993, 472–3). In the 
current economic decline, many family benefits in Russia are subject to ever 
stricter targeting criteria, but payments for foster families have remained un-
touched because they are seen to promote the implementation of the top priority, 
i. e. decreasing the number of children in institutional care (Gorina 2017).
Concerns about the well-being of a large group of children in the popula-
tion and the availability of state resources from the mid-2000s onwards were 
thus materialist factors increasing the saliency of child welfare reforms in pol-
icy circles. Yet, both they and the ideas mentioned in the previous section only 
had force due to the increasing centralisation of Russia’s political system from 
the mid-2000s that paved the way for top-down change.
The centralisation of political power
Moves under Vladimir Putin to create a clear line or 'vertical' of power 
within the Russian state reduced institutional blocks to social welfare reform that 
were present in the 1990s, for example from individual ministries, the Duma and 
regional interests (Stoner-Weiss 1997; Cook 2007). Federal authority was thus 
asserted over regions – including in the field of child welfare – and executive 
control facilitated by the dominance of the pro-presidential United Russia party 
along with restrictions on independent media and opposition parties (Gel’man 
2014). This is directly relevant to the child welfare reforms given that nowadays 
'even modest presidential support helps the adoption of major decisions and their 
implementation' (Gel’man, Starodubtsev 2016: 109). Deinstitutionalisation and 
fostering enjoyed support from the highest-level officials with children’s rights 
campaigners emphasising in our interviews that: 'there has been political will 
from above' (politicheskaya volya sverkhu). As explained earlier, references to 
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children left without parental care in presidential speeches were closely followed 
by policy responses in 2012–14 in the form of strategies and decrees. Top-level 
political support for change was also represented by the fact that Deputy Prime 
Minister for Social Affairs Olga Golodets was placed in charge of implementing 
the initial Presidential Decree No 1688 on the protection of orphans and children 
without parental care. The Ministries of Labour & Social Affairs, Health and 
Finance all broadly agreed on the need for significant change in the child welfare 
system along with the Duma and federal Public Chamber, meaning there was 
very little opposition to the reforms. The regularisation of federal-regional rela-
tions in the 2000’s meant that the reforms could have national impact by creating 
a uniform system across the country and the decision to evaluate regional gover-
nors based partly on the number of children left without parental care undoubt-
edly prompted regional action to appease the presidential administration. The 
work to promote fostering by the United Russia party further strengthened the 
feeling of political pressure for change from above.
Thus, alongside the economic growth and social policy priority, the centrali-
sation of power and strengthening of the power vertical served as a very impor-
tant facilitator for the child welfare reforms. Crucially, though, the political will 
for the child welfare reforms was shaped by wider societal context, international 
norms, expert knowledge, NGO campaigning and Russian public opinion.
NGO contributions to policy making
The Mätzke and Ostner framework acknowledges that organised interests 
outside political structures can promote policy change, but it is difficult to see 
this as a significant factor in Russia in the 2010’s. As is well documented, the 
space of Russian civil society was rather open and also the focus of substantial 
international attention during the Yeltsin era (Kulmala 2013: 122–123). However, 
the advocacy and policy campaigning activities and international collaboration 
of Russian NGOs have been increasingly restricted from the mid-2000s with a 
related reorientation towards state funding programmes (Skokova et al., forth-
coming). At the same time, the Russian government has encouraged NGOs to 
participate in emerging forms of 'network' governance in Russia, especially on 
social issues (cf. Bogdanova, Bindman 2016; Johnson et al. 2016). This trend 
provided opportunities for national children’s rights NGOs to be heavily in-
volved in designing the child welfare reforms through consultative platforms and 
committees established under different governmental structures, including the 
presidential administration, federal government, State Duma, and different min-
istries (cf. Owen, Bindman 2017). This was mostly possible because the NGO 
viewpoints fitted with the presidential administration’s family-oriented and chil-
dren’s rights ideology and the organisations adopted a consensual rather than 
oppositional stance to working with government structures.
Galina Semya, a children’s rights activist and author of the 2012–17 National 
Children’s Strategy, whom we interviewed, thus characterised the document as 
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being 'born not in the Cabinet of Ministers, but rather in the expert group' of rep-
resentatives from major NGOs whose specialist knowledge fits with understand-
ings of epistemic communities. The director of a leading NGO in the field – and 
strong critic of the former system of child welfare – similarly suggested that it was 
no coincidence that the topic of children entering care appeared in Putin’s 2006 
speech given the hard lobbying by children’s rights activists. Another activist 
highlighted that the step-by-step process requires lots of time and encourage-
ment, but can be effective:
Putin will say, soon I hope, that early detection is important. He has already 
said that work is needed to prevent orphanhood. You see, now these expert 
channels somehow reach him. It is not too far anymore. <…> Presentations 
are continually being made there [in the cross-sector platforms] and at some 
point it goes further and Putin says that one needs to get engaged in early 
detection (NGO leader, Moscow, 2015).
This quote again highlights the perceived importance of impetus from the 
presidential office for the reforms as transmitted through the 'vertical' of po-
litical control established by Vladimir Putin.
Another research participant explained that the very recent attention to 
preventive work with biological families appeared on the policy agenda be-
cause 'we kept talking and talking about it'. She was closely involved in draft-
ing Decree 481 and described the consultation process as positive from the 
start. According to her, the relevant government ministries and agencies had 
convened a group of experts and collected their views before drafting the de-
cree and during its refinement. She highlighted that government representa-
tives were genuinely open to ideas and consultation:
Usually, these things happen in the other way around: pre-written documents 
[draft laws] are passed to public hearings when there is less possibility for 
impact (NGO leader, Moscow, 2016).
At the same time she admitted that the final version of Decree 481 was not 
perfect: 'it’s not ideal, rather a compromise – but better than nothing,' alluding 
to resource issues that constrained the extent of institutional change, particu-
larly around the size of small family-like homes. In terms of impact, the re-
search participants nonetheless broadly agreed that NGO views and expertise 
had been utilised in the creation of the child welfare reforms. Importantly, in-
stitutional structures existed through which individual activists and NGOs 
could reinforce (global) norms and offer concrete advice implementing dein-
stitutionalisation once the idea had been endorsed by the political centre.
Conclusions
Despite some individual projects to promote family-like alternatives (cf. Holm-
Hansen et al. 2005: 76), it was only in the 2010s that Russia’s federal government 
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focused on systematically reorganising and unifying the state care system, launch-
ing reforms of considerable scale and speed. Our analysis suggests that the recent 
burst of policy activity in this field was driven by a range of factors. At the level of 
ideas, long-term advocacy by NGOs and wider diffusion of [international] norms 
around children’s rights penetrated into government thinking against a background 
of political and societal concern about the well-being of Russian children and the 
country’s population. Yet, it was the centralisation of power in Russia’s political 
system and prioritisation of social issues due to the demographic crisis that were 
crucial to the specific timing of reforms in the 2010s. Recently emerging 'network' 
governance systems in Russia allowed child welfare NGOs with international expe-
rience from the 1990s to reinforce messages about the importance of deinstitution-
alisation and have considerable input on the content of reforms, even if final deci-
sion-making clearly remained with government structures.
We conclude that the Russian government adopted new ideational paradigms 
and understandings of substitute care in the 2010s due to acute concern about fam-
ily well-being and the possibilities for top-down change afforded by a centralised 
political system. The next stage of our research will focus on the implementation 
and impact of the child welfare reforms in individual regions, residential homes, 
family centres and children’s lives. Early evidence indicates some difficulties in 
terms of regions failing to understand the family-oriented logic of the reforms and 
approaching them in a formal, procedural fashion with only superficial changes to 
the existing system and institutions. Yet, as Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets 
said in relation to Decree RF No 481 about restructuring children’s homes: 'All of 
our reforms will not work unless people adopt the new ideas' (Kommersant 2016).
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